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ABSTRACT
The unique role of social capital in economic activities has been increasingly
recognized. However, previous research gives limited attention to the role of
hierarchical relations in buttressing social capital in business society. Additionally,
although it is widely recognized that social capital may produce social bad, little
empirical research has been done on how the development of social capital may lead
to social risk. To fill these gaps, this study addresses issues of social capital involving
a hierarchical social structure.
Based on a survey in China, the findings of the study suggest that the interaction of
bribery-eorruption is positively related to the social capital of hierarchical relations.
The high cost of firm is found to be negatively related to the development this type of
social capital.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the unique role of social capital in economic activities has been increasingly
recognized. It is believed that social capital influences career success (Gabbay and
Zuckerman 1998), facilitates the value creation of production and team effectiveness (Tsai
and Ghoshal 1998), is positively associated with firm performance (Peng and Luo 2000) and
enhances innovation and reduces transaction costs for inter-firm collaboration (Robins and
Atuahene-Gima 2003).
However, previous research gives limited attention to the role of hierarchical relations in
buttressing social capital in business society (Uzzi 1997). Therefore despite being
acknowledged as an important component in social capital, the issue of hierarchical relations
and their impact on the development of social capital remains under-explored (Adler and
Kwon 2002). Additionally, it is widely accepted that social capital may produce social bad
(Astone et al. 1999; Warren 2001), but most of the research using the concept of social capital
focuses on the positive consequences of an adequate amount of social capital. Little empirical
research has been done on how the development of social capital may lead to social risk in a
society and to actors themselves. To fill these gaps this paper, through an empirical study,
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addresses issues of risks of social capital that Chinese firms may encounter when networking
in a hierarchical social structure.
Firms in China use networking as an effective business strategy within the current economic
in China. Of the various types of network, developing social ties embedded in the formal
hierarchical system for many firms is their important focus to access exclusive information
and operation support while facing an environment in which the Chinese government still
exerts a strong economic role (Peng and Luo 2000). In doing so, a firm may have to prudently
balance benefits and risks in the function and outcome of social capital engaging in external
relations with people who have monopoly power in business within a government system
(MPBGS). According to democratic theory, there should be a close connection between
unequally distributed background empowerment and the negative functioning of
social capital (Warren 200 I). This raises a research question: What risks does a firm
expect to face when involved in such relations? It would, therefore, be worth
investigating how status with consequent unequal power in the social structure leads to the
risks of social capital within the context of China's transition economy.
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND HIERARCHICAL RELATIONS
Social capital is a productive resource, facilitating actions in a firm's business operations (e.g.
Baker 1990; Coleman 1990; Burt 1992; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998). Nahapier and Ghoshal
(1997) argue that it makes possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would
not be possible or would come at high cost. Social capital from a perspective of function is
defined as the value to actors of those aspects or resources of the social structure that can be
used to realize their interests (Coleman 1990, pp. 302,304 and 307). This study adopts
Coleman's definition of social capital to explain the effects of hierarchical relations on a
firm's business. The concept of social structure essentially illustrates how the social capital
can function as a resource for the individual actors of certain groups. Paired exchanges of
social capital do not take place in a vacuum. They develop within a societal context in which
there is competition for the resources held by each actor (Coleman 1990, p. 133; Putnam
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1993; Fukuyama 1995). The actors' exchange of power within the structures depends on the
perceived value of resources in their interactive relationships (Molm et al. 2000).
Hierarchical relations with respect to social capital in this study refer to the structural power
between two sides with variously possible aspects of exchangeable value; and where levels of
social status are differentiated and unequal.
The imbalance of power in hierarchical relations exerts a role in determining the cost-benefits
balance in social capital, as it shapes the nature of reciprocal exchange, the level of trust and
commitment, and the expectation of continued interaction (Molm et al. 2000; Warren 2001).
On the one hand a person with MPBGS is able to help the networked firm with exclusive
information and access to resources. Their support can be crucial for the firm to enhance the
efficiency and effectiveness of business operations in a very competitive market. On the other
hand, their involvement in social capital may lead to social risks for the firm, including the
bribery-corruption interaction, high cost and self-interest pursuit (Warren 2001).
Risk of corruption and high cost in social capital of hierarchical relations
The development of social capital contains the possibility of both positive and negative
effects of social relations on societies (Uzzi 1997; Pildes 1996; Adler and Kown 2002). The
hierarchically based structural holes not only generate value for the business in information
and resources but also expose the firm to exploitation, bribery and corruption, and low trust
(Brass et al. 1998).
Warren (200 I) argues that corruption is an indirect result of too much bureaucracy and a
weak democracy. In a poorly functioning democracy, where business activities may not be
conducted creditably and the empowering institutions and legal mechanisms remain weak, the
functions of social capital are likely to be associated with negative externalities. First, these
conditions provide opportunity for some in formal hierarchical positions to design excessive
positional power for controlling economic activities as much as possible. Due to the
monopoly power in certain economic activities, resource allocation and economic policies
tend to be made without transparency to the public. This inevitably creates for firms a climate
of economic dependence on these governmental officials. From a resource dependence
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perspective (Emerson 1962; Pfeffer and Leong 1977), the exchange power results from both
access to and control over important business resources. People who control relevant
resources increase others' dependence on them, thereby acquiring power (Pfeffer, 1981; Brass
et al. 1998). Power imbalance in social exchange carries the potential for corrupt interaction
and a high cost for dependent parties.
Second, the benefits which can be provided through the social capital of hierarchical relations
lure the firm to develop such social capital at all cost, including corrupt interactions, in an
attempt to eliminate other competitors. Using embeddedness, the firm is able to deal with
people holding monopoly power to gain exclusive information and resources. At the same
time they can also effectively constrain access for other firms to the same resources and
business opportunities. This results in benefits for themselves as 'insiders' and places the
other firm as 'outsider' in the network, limiting fair competition (Warren 2001; Coleman,
1990).
Finally, the immature legal system offers little check on illegal or unethical conduct. The
structural holes created by the hierarchy strengthen the unchecked situation. Consequently,
social capital functions in a climate that cultivates the bribery-eorruption interaction, as
people with MPBGS can readily act against the regulations to fulfil their own interest.
Currently, the economy in China is developing without a parallel political openness, allowing
the government to maintain a strong influence on marketing operations. Some officials can
gain access to new economic resources by trading their power (Warren 2001). There is a
many layered and numerous bureaucracy which functions in economic control, policy
regulation and resource allocation in relation to business. The system creates no equality in
social exchanges for business firms. Unequally distributed power in controlling markets
results in many Chinese business firms depending heavily on people with MPBGS. Thus it
becomes in the interest of the firm to establish social relations with them. The bribery-
corruption interaction may be perceived as an unavoidable means of entry to the networks of
hierarchical relations or as part of the social capital strategies by a Chinese firm. The legal
system in China is relatively weak. Consequently, inappropriate interactions occurring at
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some hierarchical levels are not easily detected and monitored (Brass et al. 1998). With all
these factors, corrupt interactions are likely to increase when a firm cultivates social capital at
the hierarchical level.
To secure resourceful hierarchical relations on which the firm depends heavily, the firm as the
dependent side may have to pay a hefty cost (Bae and Gargiulo 2004). The Chinese firm is
likely to become the vulnerable side and bear the heavy cost for the social capital of
hierarchical relations.
Hypothesis 1: The bribery-corruption interaction is positively associated
with the social capital of hierarchical relations in China.
Hypothesis 2: The cost to the firm of cultivating social re lations is
positively associated to social capital based on hierarchical relations
in China.
The moderating effect of self-interest
Social capital can be simultaneously a 'private good' and a 'public good' (Warren 2001).
Taken as a private good, it may be turned from social good to social ill by individuals' with
self-seeking motivation. According to agency theory, the purpose of an individual's exchange
with others is for maximum personal outcomes. Therefore, there is a possibility of generating
negative societal effects ifactors maintain their social capital for maximizing self-interest,
especially if the social exchange is attached to imbalanced power. The power inherent in
hierarchies encompassing authority, resources, information and opportunities may engender a
desire to maximize individual outcomes from social exchange.
If people in a higher position of power in an exchange structure strongly pursue self-interest
and ignore public interest, then corruption will have a chance to occur during the development
of social capital. The positive relationship between corruption and the social capital of
hierarchical relations is likely to be stronger when the individual interest of people with
MPBGS in the interactive relations is higher.
Hypothesis 3: Self-interested motivation of people with monopoly power in





As the aim of this study was to understand the behaviour concerning social capital at the firm
level, a convenient sample was drawn from participants at Executive MBA courses where
most were CEOs and managers from the top management level. The survey was conducted in
2004 across different locations in China, including the cities of Shanghai, Beijing, Changsha
and Nanning. Participants were given questionnaires on the first day of class and asked to
return them on the last day of the course. Of the 75 individuals who actually received
questionnaires, 19 individuals did not return them, yielding a sample for this study of 56 top
management people (46 males and 10 females). Both respondents and non-respondents
represented a variety of industries.
Variable






















































The survey instrument was developed by conducting literature reviews and interviews. First,
based on conceptual discussion in the literature, a questionnaire was designed and developed.
Second, a pilot investigation was conducted with a questionnaire survey and followed
interviews with participants to obtain suggestions, comments and thoughts on the instrument.
The questionnaire was then modified. Finally, the revised questionnaire was distributed at
appropriate opportunities during 2004. The subjects were asked to express their level of
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agreement with a given statement via a five-point Likert-type scale - ranging from 'strongly
agree' to 'strongly disagree'.
Dependent variables
Social capital of hierarchical relations. This measure tested the extent to which the firm's
networks of hierarchical relations are for their business. Three items tested this variable: for
example, 'my firm has close relationships with people who hold a formal position with
privileged powers in dealing with business";
Independent variables
Corruption. This measure tested the extent to which corruption is involved when the firm
develops social networks with hierarchical relations. For example, 'it is inevitable that the
firm has to be involved in corruption if it wants to develop a close relationship with
people who hold a government position with privileged powers in business'
High firm cost. This scale measured the extent to which a firm has to pay high costs to
initiate and cultivate relationships of unequal power, when placed in a more dependent
position in the dyadic ties.
Self-interest pursuit. This measure, of three items, examined the extent to which the
motivation of those with higher status in monopoly power is perceived as self-interest.
Control variables
Since the cost and benefits of social capital are aggregated by the firm, two control
variables included in the analysis are at the firm level. Thefirm size is a measure of the
number of employees in the firm as precious research finds firm size is negatively related to
the need for social ties for survival and prosperity in China (Yeung and Tung 1996; Peng and
Luo 2000). Thefirm year measures the length of the firm's existence since established. The
length of work in the current company is also controlled for the hierarchical regression
analysis.
Analyses and Reliability
Using scales based on 56 CEOs and senior managers, the analysis involved regression on
dimensions with variables of strategy of social capital (Cronbach's alpha = 0.70), risk of
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corruption (Cronbach's alpha = 0.86), risk of high firm cost (Cronbach's alpha = 0.81) and
self-interested pursuit of hierarchical relations (Cronbach's alpha = 0.86). Prior to statistical
analysis, the codes of the responses to a number of items were reversed, so that all of the
items which were measured with a higher score represented a higher level of preference on
the scale. In the hierarchical regression analysis testing the relationship between social capital
and social risk variables, social capital was regressed by variables of the demographic factors
of CEOs and senior managers, the firm size and length of establishment (Step 1); corruption,
the firm cost and self-interest pursuit (Step 2); and the interaction of corruption with self-
interested pursuit (Step 3).
RESULTS
The means, standard deviations and Pearson correlations for demographic variables, the
dependent variable of social capital and the independent variables including risks of
corruption, the high cost to the firm and self-interested pursuit, are all presented in Table 2.
The results of correlations indicate that there is a negative relation between the social capital
and the firm cost (r = -0.49, p< 0.05). There is a positive relationship between risk of
corruption and risk of self-interest. There is also a positive relation between social capital and
the length of work experience in current companies.
Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations a for Variables
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Age b 2.18 .75 ...
2. Work years in 4.00 1.62 .32 ...
current company d
3. The firm years 21.12 .18 .50* .60**
4. The firm size 5.12 1.17 .20 .07 .33 ---
5. Social capital 4.21 .58 -.02 .53*** .26 -.13 ---
6. Risk in high cost 3.22 1.03 -.08 -.09 -.11 -.11 -.49* ---
7. Risk in self- 2.92 1.0: .09 -.01 .03 -.03 .12 .40 ---
interest
8. Risk in corruption 3.08 1.01 .15 -.19 .03 .35 -.02 .34 .57* ---
a * p < .05; ** p< .01. ***p<.OO1; (2-tailed).
h Age was coded as: 1= 20-29; 2=30-39; 3= 40-49; 4=50 or over
c Education level was coded as: 1 = primary school; 2= secondary school; 3 = bachelor' degree; 4 = postgraduate degree.
d Management position was coded as: 1 = top management; 2 = senior management; 3 = middle management; and 4 = first-
line management.
'Years in management was coded as: I = less than 2 years; 2 = 2 - 5 years; 3 = 6- 10 years; 4 = 11-20 years; and 5 = over 20
years.
The results of hierarchical regressions in Table 3 The results of hierarchical regressions in
Table 3 indicate that there is a positive linkage between the bribery--corruption interaction
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and social capital in hierarchical relations. Hypothesis I is, thus, supported. However, there is
a negative relationship between the high firm cost and social capital in hierarchical relations.
Hypothesis 2 is rejected, in an opposite direction. No coefficient for the interaction of self-
interested pursuit on the relationship of corruption and social capital is significant.
Hypothesis 3 therefore, is rejected.




































Observation number (the firm) 56 56 56
a Standardized coefficients are reported.
+p<.IO: * p<.05: ** p<.OI: *** p<.OOI
DISCUSSION
This research addresses whether a firm's social capital which is embedded in hierarchical
relations is related to the involvement of negative externalities at the firm level. The findings
of this research contribute empirical evidence to support the proposition that there is a linkage
between the social risks for the firm and the social capital of hierarchical relations in the
context of China.
Theoretical implications
The findings indicate that firms perceive that the cost of dealing with people with
monopoly power is not high. This result is opposite to the original hypothesis. It may mean
that compared with the return from investment in social networks of hierarchical relations, the
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transaction cost becomes an investment with a high pay -off. To the firm, investing in the
social capital of hierarchical relations is a 'low cost' in terms of return guarantee, when
compared with gambling on the possibility of information and allocated resources obtained
randomly through formal channels. This result is also different from that of Warren's
proposition (2001) that the more dependent side of a social relation bears a high cost for the
purpose of social capital in the hierarchical relationships. This may indicate the nature of
social capital in hierarchical relations, like other horizontal relations of social capital: both
productive and market-related (horizontal) social capital- they must end up with a gain that is
higher than the cost.
The findings of the research also indicate that there is a positive relationship between
involvement in corruption and the social capital of hierarchical relations. The findings support
the arguments of Brass et al. (1998) that negative externalities are likely to occur in sparsely
connected, weak-tie networks. The social exchanges between the firm and individuals with
power based on their formal position occur in sparsely connected networks. Both sides, but
especially the higher status side, may act to begin, terminate or resume the mutual exchanges
at anytime as they wish. The firm's relative vulnerability leads to a lowered resistance to
involvement in the bribery and corrupt interactions with people in powerful positions of
control, especially when the firm is keen to compete in the market.
Practical Implications
These findings clearly indicate that developing the social capital of hierarchical relations in
China for business the Chinese firm sometimes has to become involved in the negative
externalities of corrupt activities. The findings of this study indicate that the more social
capital gained, the more corruption the firm may have to be involved in concerning the
hierarchical relations. The discrepancy in a hierarchical relation means the two sides are not
necessarily bound to each other, with the Chinese firm, more reliant on those with monopoly
power. The empirical evidence of this study supports Warren's (2001) proposition that
corrupt exchanges are based upon allocation of information and resources that are without
transparency. Corruption may be inevitable if a market cannot run independently by following
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the free market, like the current transition economy in China which is the negative aspect of
social capital (Coleman 1990).
LIMITATION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
As with much research, this study has limitations that leave unanswered questions for the
future research. First, this study examined the risks of a high cost and potential corruption.
Other negative effects such as the risk of low trust, no reciprocity or suddenly dysfunctional
networks are not included in this study. It is important to know whether other negative
externalities can occur in the functioning of social capital and this could be explored in a
future study.
Secondly, a comparative study of hierarchical relations and other types of relations which
configure social capital may give a clear picture of how such relations are related to the risks
and benefits of social capital. Finally, there is also a need for research into the relationships
between social capital, performance and other moderating variables beyond self-interest, such
as trust and institutional interest, in order to know how social capital brings benefits and risks
within the social context of hierarchical relations.
This study has explored relationships between the social capital of hierarchical relations
and the risks to the firm. Identifying these elements can help a firm to balance the gain and
losses of social capital within relationships of higher status and economic power, especially
for firms operating within China's transition economy.
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